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Abst rac t - - In  order to model fuzzy decentralized decision-making problem, fuzzy expected value 
multilevel programming and chance-constrained multilevel programming are introduced. Further- 
more, fuzzy simulation, eural network, and genetic algorithm are integrated to produce a hybrid 
intelligent algorithm for finding the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium. Finally, two numerical examples 
are provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the hybrid intelligent algorithm. (~) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. 
All rights reserved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Multilevel programming [1,2] was developed for dealing with decentralized decision-making prob- 
lem in early 1970s. From then on, this challenging topic [3,4] has attracted more and more 
attention, which leads to a rapid development in theories, algorithms and applications. For 
detailed expositions, the reader may consult [5-8]. 
In literature, most applications of multilevel programming are in the economics area, partic- 
ularly the central economic planning [9-12]. But in practice, resources, costs, demands, and 
many other elements are often subject to fluctuations and difficult to measure. Certainly, we 
may neglect he uncertainties and solve the problem via deterministic models. However, this 
simplification may be quite costly because, sometimes the optimal solution may be infeasible 
even with respect o the realization of uncertain parameters. Hence, it is necessary for us to 
take into account explicitly the range of the possible realizations of uncertain parameters, and 
formulate the decentralized decision-making problem under uncertainty as stochastic or fuzzy 
models. Following this idea, [13] introduced the expected value model for a stochastic decentral- 
ized decision-making problem with single follower. Furthermore, [14] proposed expected value 
multilevel programming, and chance-constrained multilevel programming for stochastic decen- 
tralized decision-making problems with multiple followers. When coming to fuzzy and multilevel 
decision-making, we should mention the fuzzy interactive approach that was developed by Lai [15], 
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Lee and his coauthors [16,17]. The fuzzy interactive approach, which is essentially a combination 
of the fuzzy tolerance membership functions and multiobjective decision-making, can make the 
original problem much more simplified and much easier to solve while providing satisfactory so- 
lutions. In [18], Sakawa et El. successfully applied the fuzzy interactive approach to decentralized 
decision-making problems with fuzzy parameters. So far, fuzzy multilevel programming with 
Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium is still a new and challenging work for us. 
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. One is to propose a framework of fuzzy multilevel pro- 
gramming for modelling decentralized decision-making problems with fuzzy parameters, while 
the other is to design an efficient algorithm for finding the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium of the 
proposed fuzzy multilevel programming models. Towards these ends, the rest of this paper is 
organized as follows. In Section 2, we first recall some preliminaries on fuzzy variable, credibility 
measure and the fuzzy expected value operator. Then, we introduce the expected value multi- 
level programming with definitions of the Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium in 
Section 3. In Section 4, we recast he decentralized decision-making problem with fuzzy param- 
eters as the chance-constrained multilevel programming, and define the Nash equilibrium and 
Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium. In Section 5, we tackle several critical problems in the solution 
process and design a hybrid intelligent algorithm by integrating fuzzy simulation, neural network 
and genetic algorithm for finding the Staekelberg-Nash equilibrium. At the end of the paper, two 
numerical examples are provided to show the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. 
2. PREL IMINARIES  
Let ~ be a fuzzy variable with membership function it, and r be a real number. The possibility 
of a fuzzy event, characterized by 4 -< r, is defined by 
Pos {e _< r} = sup ,  (1) 
while the necessity of 4 ~ r is defined by 
Nec {4 _< r} = 1 - Pos {4 > r} = 1 - sup # (u). (2) 
~t~r  
The credibility measure Cr is an average of possibility measure and necessity measure, i.e., 
1 
Cr {4 ~ r} = ~ (Pos{4 ~ r} +Nec{~ _< r}). 
Based on the credibility measure, we have the expected value operator as follows. 
DEFINITION 1. (See [19].) Let ~ be a fuzzy variable. The expected value of~ is defined as 
// f E [(1 = Cr {4 -> r} dr - Cr {~ _ r} dr, (3) cx~ 
provided that at least one of the two integrals is finite. 
3. EXPECTED VALUE MULT ILEVEL  PROGRAMMING 
For simplicity, we consider a two-level decentralized decision system with fuzzy parameters. 
Assume that there is one leader and m followers, each of whom has his own decision variables, 
fuzzy constraint, and fuzzy objective. The leader can only influence the reactions of followers 
through his own decision variables, while the followers have full authority to decide how to 
optimize their own objective functions in view of the decisions of the leader and other followers. 
The following notations will be used henceforth. 
i = 1,2, . . . ,  m: index of followers; 
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x: control vector of the leader; 
yi: control vector of the ith follower; 
= (fl, f2 , . . . ,  fn): n-array fuzzy vector; 
F(x, yl,  y2,.--,  Ym, ~): objective function of the leader; 
fi(x, Yl, Y2 . . . . .  ym, ~): objective function of the ith follower; 
G(x, ~): constraint function of the leader; 
gi(x, Yl, Y2,-.-, Ym, ~): constraint function of the ith follower. 
With the idea of optimizing the expected value of objective functions ubject o some expected 
constraints, we propose the first type of fuzzy multilevel programming: expected value multilevel 
programming. 
Let the feasible set of x be defined by the expected constraint, 
E[G(x, ~)] _ 0. (4) 
Then, for each decision x chosen by the leader, the feasible set of Yi should be dependent on not 
only x but also Yl , . . . ,  yi-1, Y~+I,.-., Ym, and generally represented by the expected constraint 
E[gi(x, Yl, Y2,..., ym, f)] _< 0, (5) 
for i = 1,2 . . . .  ,m. 
Assume that the leader first chooses his control vector x, and the followers determine their 
control array (Yl,Y2,...,Ym) thereafter. In order to maximize the expected objective of the 
leader, we have the following expected value multilevel programming, 
max E IF(x, y~, y~,. . . ,  y~, ~)] 
subject o: 
E [G (x, _< o 
(y~, y~, . . . ,  y*)  solves problems (i ---- 1, 2, . . . ,  m) (6) 
{ mya~X E [fi (x, Yl, Y2,. •., Ym, ~)1 subject o: 
E [g~ (x, Yl, Y2,..., Ym, ~)] --< 0. 
DEFINITION 2. A feasible array (y~, y~,. . . ,  y*)  is called a Nash equilibrium with respect o the 
given control vector x, if it satisfies that 
E [fi (x ,y~,y~,. . . ,  Yi*-l,Yi, Yi*+l,... ,Y*,~)] -< E [fi (x, y~, y~ . . . .  ,y*,~)],  (7) 
for any feasible (Yl, Y2,- * * y*)  and i 1, 2 , . . . ,  " • ,  Y i -1 ,  Yi, Yi+l, ' • • ,  =-  m.  
DEFINITION 3. A feasible array (x*, Yl,* Y2,*..., y*)  is called a Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium, if 
it satisfies that 
E [F (X, Yl, Y2, ' ' . ,  Ym, ~)] --< E [F (x*, y~, y~, . . . ,  y*,  e)], (8) 
for any feasible Yc and the Nash equilibrium (~h,Y2,... ,Ym) with respect o Y(. 
4. CHANCE-CONSTRAINED MULT ILEVEL  PROGRAMMING 
Chance-constrained programming, which was initialized by Charnes and Cooper [20], offers 
a powerful means for modelling stochastic decision systems. In [21,22], Liu and his coauthor 
extended the chance-constrained programming to fuzzy decision systems. The essential idea of 
chance-constrained programming is to optimize some critical value with a given confidence l vel 
subject o some chance constraints. Inspired by this idea, in this section, we recast the fuzzy 
decentralized decision-making problem as chance-constrained multilevel programming. 
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By chance constraint, we mean that the fuzzy constraints will hold at a confidence l vel provided 
as an appropriate safety margin by the decision-maker. Let the feasible set of control vector x 
be defined by the chance constraint, 
Cr {a (x, ~) < 0} > n0, (9) 
where/~0 is a confidence l vel at which it is desired that the fuzzy constraints hold. Then, for 
each decision x chosen by the leader, the feasible set of control vector Yi of the ith follower should 
be dependent on not only x but also Yl,-. . ,  Y~-I, Yi+l,. . . ,  Y,~, and generally represented by the 
chance constraints, 
Cr {gi (x, Yl, Y2,..-, Y,~, ~) _< 0} k Zi, (10) 
where/3i are confidence l vels at which it is desired that the fuzzy constraints hold, i = 1, 2, . . . ,  m. 
Because of the fuzziness of ~, maxx F(x, y~, y~, . . . ,  y*,  ~) is meaningless. A natural idea is to 
provide a confidence l vel no at which it is desired that 
F 'x  * * .. * ,Yl,Y2,. ,Y,~,~)->lV 
holds, where the confidence l vel ao is provided as an appropriate safety margin by the leader. 
Then, the objective of the leader is to maximize the critical value iV with a chance constraint as 
follows, 
Cr {F(x ,y~,y~, . . . , y~, [ )  > F} >_ a0. (11) 
Then, for each decision x chosen by the leader, the objective of the ith follower is to maximize 
the critical value fi with a chance constraint as follows, 
Cr {fi(x, yl,Y2,.. .  ,Ym,~) -> J~} -> ai, (12) 
where ai are confidence l vels provided by the ith followers, i = 1, 2, . . . ,  m, respectively. 
Assume that the leader first chooses his control vector x, and the followers determine their 
control array (Yl, Y2,..., Ym), thereafter. In order to maximize the critical values of the leader 
and followers, we have the following chance-constrained multilevel programming, 
max iV 
x 
subject o: 
Cr {F(x,y~,y~,. . .  ,Ym,~) >-- iV} -> n0 
Cr {a(x, ¢) <_ 0} >__ 80 
(y~, y~, . . . ,  y*) solves problems (i = 1, 2, . . . ,  m) (13) 
[ max  Yi subject o: Cr {f~(x,y~,y~,. . . ,ym,~) _> A} >- a~ 
Cr {gi (x, y l ,Y2, . . . ,ym, ~) <_ 0} ~ ~i. 
A feasible array (y~, y~,...  ,y~) is called a N~h equilibrium with respect o a DEFINITION 4. 
given control vector x, if it satisfies that 
max{j~ [Cr {fi(x,Y~,...,Y~_I,Y,,...,Y*,~)>__ fi} >_ (x,} 
(14) 
_< max{j~lCr{f~(x ,y~,y~, . . . ,y~,~)  > ~} > a~}, 
f ° ranyfeas ib le (y l ,Y2 , " , .  Yi-l,* Yi, Yi+l,* • .., y*) and i = 1, 2, .. . ,m. 
DEFINITION 5. A feasible array (x*, yl,  y~,. . . ,  y*) is called a Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium, if 
it satisfies that 
max {iV ] Cr {F(£,Yl, Y2, ... ,ym,¢) > P} > n0} 
(15) 
<__ max{/~ ] Cr {F(x* ,y~,y~, . . . ,y~,~) _>/~} > no}, 
for any feasible Y¢ and the Nash equilibrium (.91, .92,... ,.gin) with respect o R. 
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5. HYBRID INTELL IGENT ALGORITHM 
It has been proved that multilevel programming problem is NP-hard [3,4]. Therefore, successful 
implementations of multilevel programming rely largely on efficient numerical algorithms. In the 
past three decades, many researchers have investigated the multilevel programming and designed 
many numerical algorithms (e.g., implicit enumeration scheme [23], the k th best algorithm [24], 
parametric complementary pivot algorithm [24], branch-and-bound algorithm [25], the steepest- 
descent direction [26], genetic algorithm [27] and fuzzy interactive approach [8,16]). 
As an extension of multilevel/fuzzy programming, fuzzy multilevel programming further com- 
plicates ordinary multilevel programming. We all know that searching for the Nash equilibrium 
and Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium are two tough tasks. Moreover, when searching for Nash equi- 
librium and Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium, we need many times of fuzzy simulations to evaluate 
the uncertain functions in fuzzy multilevel programming model (28) and (29). However, fuzzy 
simulations are time-consuming. So, how to speed up the solution process is another tough task. 
In the following subsections, we will achieve the three tasks and finally design an effective hybrid 
intelligent algorithm for solving general fuzzy multilevel programming models. 
5.1. Fuzzy Simulat ion 
By uncertain functions, we mean the functions with fuzzy parameters. The uncertain functions 
in fuzzy multilevel programming (6) and (13) fall into the following three types, 
U1 : (x, Yl, Y2,..., Ym) --* E IF (x, Yl, Y2,.-., Ym, ~)]; (16) 
U2: (x, Yl, Y2,. •., Y,~) ~ Cr {g (x, Yl, Y2,..., Ym, ~) -- 0} ; (17) 
U3: (x, yl ,  y2, ... ,Ym) --* max{F I Cr {F (x, yl, y2,. . .  ,Ym,~) _>/~} _> c~}. (18) 
Due to the complexity, we resort o the fuzzy simulation technique for computing the uncertain 
functions. Here, we shall not go into details and the interested reader may consult [28,29]. 
5.2. Uncer ta in  Funct ion Approx imat ion  
A neural network is essentially a nonlinear mapping from the input space to the output space. 
It is known that a neural network with an arbitrary number of hidden neurons is a universal 
approximator for continuous functions [30,31]. Moreover, it has high speed operation after it is 
well trained on a set of input-output data. In order to speed up the solution process, we train 
neural networks to approximate uncertain functions and then use the trained neural networks to 
evaluate the uncertain functions in the solution process. 
For training a neural network to approximate an uncertain function, we must first generate a 
set of input-output data, 
where x and y are control vectors of the leader and followers, respectively, z (k) are the corre- 
sponding function values that are calculated by fuzzy simulations, k = 1, 2 , . . . ,  M. Then, we 
train a neural network on the set of input-output data by using the popular backpropagation 
algorithm. Finally, the trained network characterized by U(x, y, w), where w denotes the net- 
work weights that was produced via the training process, can be used to evaluate the uncertain 
function. Thus, much computing time is saved. For detailed discussion on uncertain function 
approximation, the reader may consult [28]. 
5.3. Computing Nash Equilibrium 
It is well-known that computing Nash equilibrium is a very tough task. In this subsection, 
we construct an optimization problem whose optimal solution is the Nash equilibrium provided 
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that the optimum is zero. We also design a genetic algorithm for solving the optimization 
problem. In the following, we take the expected value multilevel programming (6) as an example 
to demonstrate how to compute Nash equilibrium. 
Define symbols 
Y-i = (Yl,Y2,.. . ,Yi- I ,Yi+I,. . . ,Ym), i = 1 ,2 , . . . ,m.  
For any decision x revealed by the leader, if the ith follower knows the strategies y_~ of other 
followers, then the optimal reaction of the ith follower is represented by a mapping, 
that solves the subproblem, 
Yi = ri (Y-i) , 
# 
max E [fi(x, Yl, Y2,..., Ym, ~)] 
Y~ 
subject o: 
E [gi (x, Yl, Y2,...,  Ym, ~)] -< 0. 
(19) 
It is clear that the Nash equilibrium of the m followers will be the solution of the system of 
equations, 
Yi = r i (y - r ) ,  i = 1 ,2 , . . . ,m.  (20) 
In other words, we should find a fixed point of the vector-valued function (rl, r2, . . . ,  rm). This 
task may be achieved by solving the following minimization problem, 
m 
min R (Yl, Y2,..., Ym) = .~ IlYi - ri (y-i)]] 
subject o: (21) 
E[gi(x, y l ,yz , . . . ,ym,~)]  _< 0, i = 1 ,2 , . . . ,m.  
If the optimal solution (y~, y~ . . . .  , Ym) satisfies that 
R(y~, y~,. . . ,  y* )  = 0, (22) 
then yi ~(Y-i) for i = 1,2, . . . ,  m. Hence, (y~, y~, . . . ,ym)  must be a Nash equilibrium for 
the given x. 
In a numerical solution process, if the optimal solution (y~, y~, . . . ,  y* )  satisfies that 
R/  $ $ $ (Yl,Y2,"" ,Y-~) -< e, (23) 
where s is a small positive number, then it can be regarded as a Nash equilibrium for the given x. 
Otherwise, the system of equations (20) might be considered inconsistent. That is, there is no 
Nash equilibrium with respect o the given control vector x. 
Now let us turn attention to the optimization problem (21). Since the objective function 
involves m mappings, 
ri (Y-r), i = 1 ,2 , . . . ,m,  
the objective function may be very complex. So, we employ genetic algorithm to search for the 
Nash equilibrium. 
For a given control vector x, the genetic algorithm procedure for finding the Nash equilibrium 
of the optimization problem (20) is given as follows. 
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Genetic Algorithm for Nash Equilibrium 
Step 1. Input a feasible control vector x. 
Step 2. Generate a population of chromosomes y(D, j _- 1, 2,... ,pop_size at random from 
the feasible set. 
Step 3. Calculate the the objective values of chromosomes. 
Step 4. Compute the fitness of each chromosome according to the objective values. 
Step 5. Select he chromosomes by spinning the roulette wheel. 
Step 6. Update the chromosomes by crossover and mutation operations. 
Step 7. Repeat Steps 3-6 until the best chromosome satisfies inequality (23). 
Step 8. Return the Nash equilibrium y(x) = (yl(x), y2(x),..., ym(x)). 
5.4. Hybr id Intelligent Algorithm 
For any feasible control vector x revealed by the leader, denote the Nash equilibrium with 
respect o x by (Yl (x), y2(x),..., ym (x)), then the expected value multilevel programming (6) 
can be simplified as follows, 
[ maxE[F(x, yl(x),y2(x),...,y,~(x),~)] subject o: 
E [G(x, ¢)] < 0. 
(24) 
The objective function ElF(x, yl(x), y2(x),..., y,~(x), ~)] involves not only uncertain parame- 
ters, but also a complex mapping 
x ~ (Yl (x),y2 (x) , . . . ,ym (x)), 
which makes the optimization problem difficult to solve. Therefore, genetic algorithm is a good 
candidate for solving such a model for the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium, although it is a relatively 
slow way. 
Now, we integrate fuzzy simulation, neural network, and genetic algorithm to produce ahybrid 
intelligent algorithm for solving general expected value multilevel programming with multiple 
followers. 
Hybrid Intelligent Algorithm for Stackelberg-Nash Equil ibrium 
Step 1. Generate input-output data of uncertain functions uch as (16), (17), and (18). 
Step 2. Train neural networks by the backpropagation algorithm. 
Step 3. Initialize a population of chromosomes x(0, i = 1, 2,... ,pop_size randomly. 
Step 4. Compute the Nash equilibrium (Yl (x(0), Y2 (x(0),..., y,~ (x(0)) for chromosome x(0. 
Step 5. Compute the fitness of each chromosome according to the objective values. 
Step 6. Select he chromosomes by spinning the roulette wheel. 
Step 7. Update the chromosomes by crossover and mutation operations. 
Step 8. Repeat Steps 4-7 for a given number of cycles. 
Step 9. Return the best chromosome as the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium. 
By a similar process, we can also design a hybrid intelligent algorithm to solve fuzzy chance- 
constrained multilevel programming for the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium. 
6. NUMERICAL  EXAMPLES 
In order to illustrate the effectiveness ofthe hybrid intelligent algorithm, we give two numerical 
examples that are performed on a personal computer. 
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EXAMPLE 1. Consider the following fuzzy expected value multilevel programming, 
max E [4 (xl + x2 + x3 + x4) ~ - 9 (Yh + Y~I - ~1)2 - 16 (Y~2 + Y~2 - ~2)21 
Xl IX2~X3~X4 t 
subject to: 
xl +x2+x3+z4 <_5 
Xl~X2,~3,X 4 > 0 
(Y~I, Y~2, Y~I, Y~2) solves the problems 
max E [(Yn~3 + Y12~4) (Y21 + Y22)] 
Y l l~12 
subject o: 
5yn 4- 7y12 <__ 10xl (25) 
5Yll 4- 3y12 <_ 10x2 
Yll,Y12 >- 0 
max E [(Vll 4- V12) (Y21~3 4- ~122~4)] 
Y21 ,Y2 2 
subject o: 
4y21 + 5y22 _< 10x3 
6y21 + 5y22 < lOx4 
Y21, Y22 >-- 0, 
where ~1, ~2, ~3 and ~4 are triangular fuzzy numbers (2, 3, 4), (3, 4, 5), (4, 5, 6), and (5, 6, 7), 
respectively. 
In order to solve model (25), the hybrid intelligent algorithm proposed in Section 5 has been 
run with 5000 cycles in fuzzy simulations, 3000 samples in training neural networks, and 1000 
generations in genetic algorithm. The reported Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium is 
$ $ $ ~, (x~, x~., xa, x4) = (2.3678, 1.4828, 0.5708, 0.5786), 
(Y11, Yn) = (1.6383, 2.2123), (Y21, Y~2) = (0.0390, 1.1103). 
The optimal objective values of the leader and two followers are 71.61, 24.67, and 26.40, respec- 
tively. 
A further numerical study was carried out when the parameters in the hybrid intelligent algo- 
rithm such as the population size (pop_size), the probability of crossover (Pc), and the probability 
of mutation (P,~) vary. The result is shown in Table 1. In order to account for it, we present 
an index, called percent error, i.e., (actual value - optimal value)/optimal value x100%, where 
the optimal value is the minimal one of all the six maximum obtained above. The last column 
named by "error" in Table 1 is just this index. From Table 1, we can see that the percent error 
does not exceed 2% when different parameters are selected, which implies that the hybrid intel- 
ligent algorithm is robust to the parameter settings and effective to solve fuzzy expected value 
multilevel programming (6). 
Table 1. Comparison solutions of Example 1. 
pop_size Pc Pm Gen 
30 0.1 0.3 1000 
30 0,1 0.5 1000 
30 0.3 0.5 1000 
50 0.i 0.3 I000 
50 0,I 0.5 i000 
50 0.3 0.5 i000 
Optimal Solution Objective Error (%) 
(2.465250, I.455660,0,510724,0.568366) 71.68 {:13 
(2.345015,1.474000,0,592859,0.588126) 71.39 0.27 
(2.367780,1.482845,0.570782,0.578591) 71.61 0.58 
(2.613507,1.626057,0,377139,0.383296) 71.54 0.48 
(2.868575,1.505056,0,253580,0.372787) 71.20 0.00 
71.53 0.46 (2.408057,1.527778,0.534862,0.529302) 
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EXAMPLE 2. Consider the following fuzzy chance-constrained multilevel programming, 
max /~ 
Xl t~2,X31~4 
subject to: 
Cr {4(x 1 J-::/:2 ~-x3 Jr"x4) 2-9(y~l j -y~l  -ql)t x2_16,(Y12* -~-Y~2-(2) 2 >- F} - > 0.90 
11 +12 +xa +14 _< 5 
11,x2,13,x 4 > 0 
(Y~I, Y~'2, Y~I, Y~2) solves the problems 
( max/1 
~II ,~12 
/ subject o: 
Cr + + > o.9o 
5yll "~ 7y12 _ 1011 
5yll + 3Y12 _< 1012 
~. Y11,Y12 ~ 0 
max f2 
Y21 ,Y22 
subject o: 
+ + > A}  > 0.90 
4y21 + 5y22 _~ 10x3 
6y21 + 5y22 <_ 1014 
Y21, Y22 ~ 0, 
(26) 
where {1, (2, ~3 and ~4 are triangular fuzzy numbers (2,3,4), (3,4,5), (4,5,6), and (5,6,7), 
respectively. 
After a run of the hybrid intelligent algorithm with 5000 cycles in fuzzy simulations, 5000 
samples for training neural networks, and 1000 generations in genetic algorithm, we get the 
Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium, 
(x~, x~, x~, x~) ---- (2.4705, 1.4305, 0.5487, 0.5503), 
(Y~I, Y~2) -- (1.3010, 2.6000), (Y~I, Y22) -- (0.0084, 1.0906). 
The optimal objective values of the leader and two followers are 26.47, 20.86, and 22.26, respec- 
tively. 
A numerical study was also carried out to compare the solutions obtained by running the hybrid 
intelligent algorithm with various parameter settings, and all the computational results are shown 
in Table 2, where the cycle number in the fuzzy simulation is 5000 and the number of samples 
in training neural networks is 5000. From Table 2, we can see that the percent error in the last 
column does not exceed 3%, which implies that the hybrid intelligent algorithm is robust o the 
parameter settings and effective to solve fuzzy chance-constrained multilevel programming (13). 
Table 2. 
pop_size Pc Pm Gen 
30 0.1 0.3 1000 
30 0.1 0.5 1000 
30 0.3 0.5 1000 
50 0.i 0.3 I000 
50 0.1 0.5 1000 
50 0.3 0.5 1000 
Comparison solutions of Example 2. 
Optimal Solution Objective Error (%) 
(2.4351, .4364, 0.5487, 0.5798) 26.42 1.54 
(2.6687, 1.5092, 0.3982, 0.4240) 26.80 2.96 
(2.4705, 1.4305, 0.5487, 0.5503) 26.47 1.70 
(2.8359, 1.4269, 0.3051, 0.4321) 26.60 2.20 
(2.6962, 1.4999, 0.3826, 0.4214) 26.77 2.85 
(2.2758, 1.3506, 0.6906, 0.6830) 26.03 0.00 
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, a framework of fuzzy multilevel programming was proposed for dealing with 
decentralized decision making problem with fuzzy parameters. In order to find the Stackelberg- 
Nash equilibrium, a hybrid intelligent algorithm was designed by integrating fuzzy simulation, 
neural network and genetic algorithm. Two numerical examples howed that the hybrid intelligent 
algorithm is robust and effective. 
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